

Central Asia 2030 . . .

Novels, academic literature and cinema all tend to take a bleak view in forecasting the future. Futuristic novels from the 1920s and 1930s, such as *We* by Yevgeny Zamyatin and *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley, paint a grim picture of a unified, all-encompassing state that controls people's lives and thoughts: the perfect authoritarian state. In the 1990s, in the less fantastic, more realistic field of academic international policy, Samuel Huntington predicted a clash of civilisations and Francis Fukuyama's more upbeat *The End of History?* prophesied that liberal democracy would become the main form of government in the world, ending ideological competition. This would bring an end to history, leaving only events rather than in-depth developments. Meanwhile, Hollywood cinema during the last decade has further developed the disaster genre. More movies have as their central theme devastating climate change, the global spread of deadly viruses or nuclear catastrophe. With the possible exception of Fukuyama, who later toned down his hopes for the triumph of democracy, few of these works have presented positive outlooks on the future.


Predicting the future of Central Asia based on its progress over the last 20 years unfortunately seems to fit in with this tradition – although hopefully, and most likely, the downward trend will be less radical. Authoritarian rule is firmly established, even if not to the extent described by Zamyatin and Huxley. Chinese, Russian, Western and Islamic civilisations are coming into collision in Central Asia, just as Huntington predicted. Fukuyama might also have been partially right, in that democracy appears to be the only model that can help the region develop. Environmental prospects for Central Asia over the coming decades are also worrying. Increased drought is likely, which could potentially lead to natural disasters. For example, the partial disappearance of the Aral Sea was a disaster in slow motion.

Central Asia's future can be examined from three different perspectives: national, regional and external. The greatest challenges for the region's young countries are at the national level. The republics have only been independent for 20 years, so further state-building is needed. With the Soviet legacy quickly disappearing, future leaders will need new arguments to help them retain popular support. So, nationalism and growing adherence to Islam will likely be central to the countries' prospects in the coming decades. On the regional level, there has been little cooperation among the five Central Asian countries. Meaningful

cooperation has been blocked by distrust among the different leaderships, as well as by fears of handing over to regional mechanisms powers that were only recently acquired. Further regional disintegration is more likely than countries seeking joint solutions for their shared problems. On the external relations front, Central Asian states are inexperienced and young, and at the same time, some of them are strategically important or rich in energy resources. So, outside powers have sought to increase their influence. Russia, China and, to a slightly lesser extent, the U.S. have been most involved, but other players such as Europe, India and Turkey have also taken an interest in the region. As they mature, all Central Asian states will develop their own relations with external powers. China will be especially important in the region over the coming decades, and the influence of Islamic states too will be a factor to watch.

This EUCAM newsletter looks into prospects for the development of Central Asia as a region and expectations regarding the development of Central Asian societies. Last year, the Central Asian republics celebrated 20 years of independence. What will their region and their countries look like in 2030? We invited four top Central Asia watchers to look in their crystal balls and tell us what they see in 2030. Alain Délétroz of the International Crisis Group (ICG) foresees the disintegration of the regional notion of Central Asia, linked to declining Russian influence, and attaches particular importance to Central Asia's biggest states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Marlene Laruelle, director of George Washington University's Central Asia Program (CAP) and EUCAM researcher, believes that the Central Asian regional notion is not sustainable and describes how the five states might each take a different path of development. Nargis Kassenova of KIMEP University examines two possible scenarios involving external actors, most importantly Russia, China and Islamic republics, while placing hopes for positive change on the region's younger generation. Shairbek Juraev of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek also argues that a new generation will have the opportunity to shape the region, and describes three, so far mostly negative, determining trends: economics, governance and regional cooperation. Taken together, these essays offer a comprehensive picture of current developments and future prospects.

Editorial by Jos Boonstra, Head EUCAM Programme



Newsletter



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EUCAM Essays

A new Central Asia security set-up

Alain Déletroz is vice-president (Europe) at the International Crisis Group (this comment does not reflect ICG's views)

Looking at the future is always a challenging exercise. Thinking about Central Asia, especially given the instability of the world economy today, seems like fortune telling. What will happen with the Eurozone? Will China continue on its present course to become the great power of the twenty-first century, or will it experience a deep economic or socio-political crisis? Will Russia continue its decay into a poorly-managed and weak 'sovereign democracy' state, with dwindling ability to deploy power outside its own borders? And, above all, will Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan experience smooth political transitions when the two presidents of the first 20 years of independence are gone? Will either of the two big countries of the region experience the destruction of their autocratic regimes, whether through an Arab-style revolution or through a top-down initiative by reform-minded leaders?

The fates of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be decisive for the development of the region. Should one of these two countries fall into chaos once President Nursultan Nazarbayev or President Islam Karimov leaves the scene, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would also stumble, and the shock waves would be felt throughout the region, including in Russia and China. If one of them were to move towards the establishment of a state based on the rule of law, with more openness for people and business, this positive development would boost the prospects of their smaller neighbours at least. But the evolution of these two countries up until now could suggest that in 2030, the region will be even less culturally and socially integrated than it is today. Russian will have ceased to serve as the lingua franca, today understood and spoken by more than 80 per cent of Central Asians. The elites will be more likely to communicate among themselves in English or even in Chinese. They will be much more attuned to China, Asia, the Gulf, Europe and the U.S than they are to Russia, which will have faded away as a key diplomatic and military power in the region. A globalised, enriched elite will rule over nations much more confined to their communities than they are at the moment. Many people between 20 and 30 years of age will be frustrated by the lack of possibilities offered by the political systems under which they live. The elites will live in fear of 'orange' or 'Arab' revolutions, while anger and frustration among the dispossessed will trigger cycles of social outburst and repression. Borders and lack of regional integration will remain a major hindrance to the movement of people and

goods. Everywhere, inequities will have expanded enormously. The Internet will be tightly controlled and the region will lack good analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. Criminalised politics will have a chilling effect on people's faith in governments and states, and decaying infrastructures all over the region will seriously impact on people's quality of life. Large sectors of Central Asian societies will take refuge in very conservative forms of religious expression, providing a fertile ground for extremist preachers and jihadist groups.

If these negative outcomes are to be avoided, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will have to escape from clan wars for power after their first presidents disappear. They will need to be lucky enough to obtain new leaders with the vision and strength to change their political direction and to begin the implementation of profound socio-economic reforms. As Myanmar has shown the world, the worst is not always a necessary historical outcome in autocratic regimes. The right leaders at the top of a closed state can make a lot of difference.

The evolution of Afghanistan and Pakistan will have direct consequences on Central Asia, particularly on its most fragile states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Should these countries continue on their path of instability, they will provide safe havens for Central Asian jihadist groups, who will receive training and combat experience there. Back home, these groups will easily flourish in the impoverished areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where hearts and minds have already been prepared by the preaching of HizbutTahrir. Moscow's failure to keep Uzbekistan in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), as well as its inability to mount a military reaction in deadly local conflicts such as in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, will force China to abandon its usual distaste for military involvement abroad. It will begin to play a more visible role in the security set-up of the region. Faced with the danger that constant unrest and instability in southern Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could spread into its own Xinjiang province, China will in 2030 have taken over the training and supervision of Kyrgyz armed forces and Tajik border guards. Russia will still maintain a symbolic military presence in Kant, but it will lack the deployment capacities and financial backing for long-term actions. So, it will not be able to play a credible security role in the region. NATO countries will have shut down all their military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and they will show little interest in playing any role at all in Central Asian security.

The huge attraction of China's economic growth and the fading away of Russian and Western strategic interests will have a lasting and immense impact on Central Asia and its security set-up in 2030.

Goodbye to the idea of a region

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It is 2030, and Central Asia no longer exists as a regional entity. The geopolitical and domestic pathways of each of the five states are so different that the established elites hardly ever mention the theme of regional unity. The Eurasian Union launched by Russia in 2010 failed when the Kazakh elites who succeeded the first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, rejected a close economic alliance with Moscow. Kazakhstan remains Russia's ally at the strategic level, but the two countries have little economic interaction. An Uzbek-Tajik conflict, combined with regular Islamic insurgencies on the Kyrgyz

and Uzbek side of the Fergana Valley at the start of the 2020s, has deeply undermined possibilities for regional cooperation. Ethno-nationalism has become a major cultural feature of new Central Asian generations.

The political paths of the region's states have become divergent, but all of them are characterised by polarisation among the young generations born in the 2000s to 2010s. There are numerous ideological debates between the supporters of a European model, of the Chinese model, and of an Islamic model, showing signs of the democratisation of the Central Asian elites. Throughout the region, Islamism has gained in recognition as a political ideology because of its denunciation of the corruption of the elites and its calls for greater social justice. Tajikistan became an Islamic republic at the end of 2020, led by the new elites that replaced the Islamic Rebirth Party, which was judged too moderate. They drew their inspiration from the system in force in Turkey and in several Middle Eastern countries, in which people have been trying to establish Islamic democracy. Uzbekistan violently repressed Islamic insurgent movements that sprang up in the Fergana Valley in the 2020s.

The countries' economic situations are also very diverse. The Kazakh population has living standards equal to those of Central European countries. The country leans towards the Malaysian model: the regime is a form of authoritarian democracy, Islam has obtained a more official status, and society is focused on the Asia-Pacific region. Turkmenistan remains a closed state, but it has improved the redistribution of its gas rent among its own population. It looks to certain Gulf countries, having officialised a conservative (but non-Wahhabi) reading of Islam. Kyrgyzstan avoided an Islamic revolution and based itself on the Philippine system: the authorities have recognised labour migration as the country's main economic resource. Similarly, the Tajiks export themselves as labour power to the Gulf countries and to China, making Tajikistan the first Islamic state in which the economy is entirely based on remittances.

With the exception of Turkmenistan, the states of Central Asia, along with Russia, are all members both of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and of the free trade zone with China. Beijing is the primary trading partner of all Eurasia. Many Central Asian countries have political parties that believe in a Chinese-type, authoritarian, nationalist model, but Sino-phobia has also become a major feature of Central Asian societies. Russia remains influential in strategic affairs in Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan, but it is now a minor actor in the other states of the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Korea and the countries of South-East Asia have come to be key partners of the Central Asian countries, whereas India has not increased its influence. Europe and the United States are not important actors in the region, apart from in Kazakhstan: the European Union has accorded Kazakhstan the status of a partner state and tries to use it as a bridgehead to draw closer to the new Asian powers.

Governance has improved in Kazakhstan, and in the international arena, the country has become representative of a modernising Asian Islam. It has also improved in Kyrgyzstan: the Philippine-style strategy has led to fundamental state reforms, and the Kyrgyz diaspora plays a major political role in the country, supplying a large share of the political class. In Tajikistan, the Islamic government has retaken control of specific social sectors such as health and education, but the political regime applies a conservative version of the Sharia law that has forced some of the elite into exile. In Uzbekistan and in Turkmenistan, the elites continue their

authoritarian rule over their countries in the name of the fight against radical Islamism and to defend their patrimonial interests. Drug trafficking in the region has diminished in significance since the 2020s, when Russia decided to combat domestic consumption and set up a major programme in partnership with Europe to fight against narco-consumption.

Forty years after they won their independence, the Central Asian states present contrasting faces: an Islamic state in Tajikistan, a diaspora state in Kyrgyzstan, a southeast-Asian-style democracy in Kazakhstan, a conservative Gulf-style one in Turkmenistan, and a post-Soviet patronal authoritarian state in Uzbekistan.

Central Asia: now as in 2030, at the crossroads

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Central Asian states entered their third decade of independence in a state of political stagnation pregnant with crises. The first 20 years have followed the logic of state- and nation-building, internal centralisation of power and balancing external interests and pressures. Relative stability partly compensated for the deficiencies of the super-concentration of power in the hands of presidents, at the expense of other institutions. This stability ended in Kyrgyzstan in the mid-2000s, and it could be coming to an end in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Political succession is uncertain and new political forces are emerging, fuelled by nationalist and Islamist ideas. The effect could be the transformation of the system. Will Central Asian elites be able to maintain political and social cohesion after their national leaders are gone? Can they find organising ideas for their countries and for the region as a whole?

The uncertainty of Central Asian states' futures is also the result of the region's location at the intersection of Islamic and Russian/European civilisations, and on the periphery of the Chinese one. A lot will depend on how Central Asians 'digest' these influences in the coming decades. Do the upheavals and complex social and ideological dynamics in the Middle East presage similar processes in Central Asia? Will the region become more integrated into the Islamic world? Can Russia recover its position and role as a transmitter of European ideas? Or will Europe and the rest of the West be able to keep Central Asia in their sphere of influence by working directly in the region? Will Chinese economic dynamism lessen the cultural barriers and the problem of 'warm politics, cold public'? The answers to these questions will depend on developments in Russia, the EU, China, the Middle East and South Asia, opening up another set of uncertainties. The following highly speculative scenarios hint at possible futures.

Scenario 1: From Russian-Chinese condominium to 'Arab revolutions'

The West, exhausted by the Afghanistan campaign and busy with new flashpoints in the Middle East and North Africa, decreases its presence in Central Asia, leaving the region largely to Russia and China. These two countries try to foster the accommodation of their interests in the region that they began under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Russia's economic influence continues to diminish, despite the inclusion and semi-inclusion of Central Asian states in the Eurasian Economic Union. Member states resist further integration and the project loses

momentum. Eventually, a change of heart takes place in Moscow as well, and the Russian leadership decides that it needs to focus on modernisation inside the country, instead of pursuing expensive geopolitical dreams abroad. Ironically, that leads to better relations with Central Asian states.

China continues its economic growth and becomes the region's key trading partner. It invests in Central Asian states and builds infrastructure there to support its investments. However, growing nationalism hinders its progress. People spread fewer myths about China and Sino-phobia declines, but the Central Asian countries increasingly fear being overwhelmed by Chinese influence. This results in a widespread conviction of the need to develop a regional Central Asian identity along with national identities.

The security situation is likely to worsen, even if political succession has gone relatively smoothly. Beijing tries to make things better by providing more development assistance and expects Moscow to take responsibility for regional security. Russian policy-makers are hesitant about the extent to which they are willing to commit. As a result, Central Asian governments are largely left to their own devices. If they opt for traditional repressive methods, the spectre of Arab-style revolutions will appear on the horizon.

Scenario 2: Looking West and going South

Fragmentation of the region continues. In Kazakhstan, pro-Western nationalists become more prominent among ruling elites. Astana looks to Europe as a source of modernisation and to the U.S. and NATO as security partners. It values its Turkic identity and the South Caucasus corridor that connects it to the West. In the best-case scenario, the new elites are concerned with improving the people's social welfare and diffusing the destabilising potential of inequalities. Kyrgyzstan experiences a similar wave of 'nationalism on the rise', but due to its greater dependence on Russia and Kazakhstan, it has less room for manoeuvre to conduct its foreign policy in accordance with this new attitude. Manifestations of radical nationalism are more likely because of its weaker statehood.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on the other hand, are experiencing a stronger pull to the South, due to continuing Islamic revival and the 'traditionalisation' of society. They both face a serious challenge in the form of political Islam. In Uzbekistan, attempts at repression lead to upheaval; in Tajikistan, the state is forced to find some accommodation with Islamists. Both countries experience major economic problems and rising levels of poverty and deprivation. In the best-case scenario, the post-Karimov government in Uzbekistan begins to implement economic reforms, freeing the entrepreneurial energies of the population. This includes improving relations with its neighbours. The Islamists that come to power in Tajikistan focus on governance reforms, limiting corruption and raising living standards.

Turkmenistan continues its isolated drift for a while. Eventually, the government reaches the point of self-destruction. Various Islamic, pro-democracy and criminal groups start competing for power. China, Turkey and the EU try to mitigate the process so as to prevent the implosion of the country.

Current trends in the region and its vicinity seem to predict troubled times for Central Asia. However, a crisis can also be an opportunity. By 2030, the Soviet civilisation will be entirely gone. Generations born after the collapse of the Soviet Union will be in their 30s and 40s, forming self-identities and defining policies. A lot will depend

on the vector of development that they choose.

Three key challenges for Central Asia

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Central Asia in 2030 could be a region where societies are economically prosperous, with democratic political institutions and human-friendly borders – since 'no borders' sounds too idealistic – in a peaceful neighbourhood of similarly prospering democratic states. To say this vision is a prediction, though, would risk leaving 'a beautiful hypothesis slain by an ugly fact'. The past 20 years presented both dramatic changes and astonishing continuities in the region, both of which will definitely impact on developments in the next 20 years and beyond. Below are three key current trends that will likely challenge the positive vision for 2030 described above. These trends will need to be addressed if Central Asia is to achieve its full potential.

Widening economic gap

In the past 20 years, the economic gap among the five Central Asian states, which was already significant in 1990, has widened further. GDP per capita in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1990 amounted to 35.6 and 41.8 per cent of the GDP per capita in Kazakhstan in the same year. In 2011, Kyrgyzstan's GDP per capita was 18.3 per cent of that of Kazakhstan's, and Tajikistan's was 17.7 per cent. Similarly, the combined size of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's GDP as a portion of the region's GDP dropped from 13 per cent in 1990 to 7 per cent in 2011. More importantly, there seem to be no strong evidence to suggest that this trend will reverse itself in the coming decades.




Chart 1. Source: World Economic Development Indicators database, World Bank, available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx> [accessed on 18 January 2013].

The Central Asian economies remain heavily dependent on one or two export items. As of 2010, aluminium made up more than half of Tajikistan's exports and gold accounted for over half of Kyrgyzstan's exports. Oil and/or gas heavily dominate the exports of Kazakhstan (50-60 per cent) and Turkmenistan (over 80 per cent). This suggests a very precarious situation for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, given the volume of their main export items and the complications involved in the operations of the relevant sectors of the economy.

This widening gap in economic development is reflected in the increasing number of labour migrants from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. According to a 2010 ICG report, in 2008 remittances composed 49 per cent of GDP in Tajikistan, 27 per cent in Kyrgyzstan and 13 per cent in Uzbekistan.

This trend is likely to continue. In 2010, the United Nations World Population Prospects report said that the largest population sector in Central Asia was teenagers: people aged between 15 and 19

years of age made up 10.3 per cent of the total population. Over the next 20 years, this group will join the active workforce, but the countries' economies do not seem to be generating more jobs. It is expected that population growth in the region in 2010-2030 will outpace the 10 million growth in 1990-2010, which means the challenge will only get worse.

The economic discrepancy between larger and energy-rich economies on the one hand and smaller and more vulnerable economies on the other will likely continue to widen in the coming decades. This will have a negative impact on public services such as education and healthcare, as well as on labour migration.

Weak political institutions

In 20 years, the five former Soviet republics have not established robust political institutions or the rule of law. The Soviet-inherited state infrastructure can still hinder the development of civil society and private economic activities, even as it fails to provide security and/or welfare to the public. None of the Central Asian states has developed established rules of political power succession. Elections remain a formality aimed at legitimising the political decisions of the incumbent regime. Some exceptions have occurred, such as the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, but it remains to be seen in 2030 whether this was an isolated case or the beginning of change.

The future transfer of power in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is frequently discussed in terms of its implications for stability (and less often, for democracy) in the countries and the region. The experiences of power succession in the other three states offer three different scenarios: 'the king is dead, long live the king' in Turkmenistan, violent overthrows in Kyrgyzstan and succession during civil war in Tajikistan. Some less dramatic examples from former Soviet states include the pre-planned scenarios involving Boris Yeltsin in Russia and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan. It is to be hoped that the first post-Soviet power successions in Astana and Tashkent will benefit the countries' people and create clear and good rules for future power transfers.

Nevertheless, the problem of political institutions and laws accommodating personal political decisions, rather than vice-versa, will remain the key issue in Central Asia until 2030 and after. While democratic transition has been successfully countered and is regarded as irrelevant by Central Asian regimes, communities in the region are in transition in terms of identifying their relationship to modern formal state institutions and law. Some long-term critical points of this transition include the post-1917 and post-1991 events, and as we move toward 2030, with any luck this process could develop into a bottom-up experience rather than a top-down experiment.

Poor regional cooperation

In the early twentieth century, the Soviet Union revised the map of Central Asia, creating five republics that were assumed to be culturally and linguistically distinct. However, these republics were tightly linked together through infrastructure such as roads, power lines, hydro-facilities and so on. Since 1991, these connecting Soviet legacies have consistently broken down, and the newly independent states rushed to transform Soviet administrative borders into full-fledged national borders that were like iron, both physically and metaphorically. Cross-border exchanges among ordinary people have become severely problematic due

to complicated checkpoint controls, toughened visa requirements and, in some cases, landmines.

In 20 years, the Central Asian states have failed to devise a common approach on the use of the region's major rivers. Energy-poor upstream states Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have desperately sought opportunities to construct large-scale facilities. These plans have intensified in the last five to six years, much to the discontent of downstream neighbours, especially Uzbekistan. So far, unfriendly gestures have included blocking transiting rail cars, arbitrary cuts of gas supply and occasional demonstrations by armed vehicles at the border sites.

Calls for regional integration, so typical of the 1990s, sound rhetorical today. Even so, building a peaceful and secure region will require the new generations in Central Asia to develop deeper levels of mutual exchange and to demonstrate greater openness to cooperation, rather than to tighten border controls.

These three trends are likely to impact on the region's development in the coming decades. Other dynamic processes will also become important variables, such as, for example, developments in education or demography, or security challenges in adjacent regions. While challenges abound, there is reason for hope in the proactive part of the new generation of Central Asians and their international partners, who will try to ensure their work tends toward development, democracy and cooperation.

New EUCAM Publications

The Afghanistan-Central Asia relationship: What role for the EU?

Marlene Laruelle, Sebastien Peyrouse and Vera Axyonova, EUCAM Working Paper No. 13, February 2013

As the 2014 NATO drawdown from Afghanistan approaches, the EU increasingly focuses on preventing potential spillover effects on Central Asia. The Union wishes to further its cooperation with the wider region. But to succeed, it will have to develop a clearer strategy to avoid condoning the repressive policies and opaque interests of the Central Asian governments. The EU should focus on a few well-chosen areas and prioritise the involvement of local actors, in particular civilian stakeholders, who are the only vectors of long-term sustainable solutions. This paper addresses the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship, analyses the impact of post-2014 changes to the security context and looks at the EU's opportunities to foster regional dynamics.

Download: http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Working_Papers/EUCAM-WP13-Afghanistan-EN.pdf

The EU Education Initiative for Central Asia five years on: lessons learnt?

Vera Axyonova, EUCAM Policy Brief No. 30, February 2013

The EU has signalled education as a priority for its support to Central Asia. Specific activities include attempts to establish regular regional and bilateral dialogues; assistance in reforming higher and vocational education; programmes to facilitate academic exchanges; and e-networking. This policy brief offers a critical assessment of the EU's engagement and the lessons learnt from the European Education Initiative for Central Asia.

Download: http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/

[Policy_Briefs/EUCAM-PB-30-EN-Education.pdf](#)

The EU's humanitarian aid and civil protection policy in Central Asia: Past crises and emergencies to come

Bruno De Cordier, EUCAM Policy Brief No. 29, January 2013

EU humanitarian assistance to Central Asia is often overlooked as an essential ingredient of EU policy towards Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have benefited substantially from EU humanitarian assistance, but capacity building to meet challenges remains weak. Kazakhstan has found a niche as a coordination hub, and also itself offers assistance. How have EU activities developed, what are EU objectives in Central Asia and how might Europe's approach evolve?

Download: http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Policy_Briefs/EUCAM-PB-29-EN-EU-Humanitarian-Aid.pdf

European National Policies Series

Even as the European Union has consolidated its approach to Central Asia, many European countries, including non-EU members, have developed national policies towards Central Asia or towards specific countries in the region. The European National Policies Series seeks to map the policies of European states towards Central Asia in the fields of politics, democratic and human rights values, trade and energy, and security and development. What are the approaches of Belgium, Luxembourg, Romania and Baltic States?

Belgium-Luxembourg and Central Asia, EUCAM National Series Policy Brief No. 13

Fabienne Bossuyt, March 2013

http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_RU/Policy_Briefs_RU/National_Policies_of_European_Countries/National-PB13-BELUX.pdf

Romania and Central Asia, EUCAM National Series Policy Brief No. 12

Georgiana Marin, March 2013

http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_RU/Policy_Briefs_RU/National_Policies_of_European_Countries/National-PB12-ROM.pdf

The Baltic states and Central Asia, EUCAM National Series Policy Brief No. 11

by Anete Jekabsone, March 2013

http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_RU/Policy_Briefs_RU/National_Policies_of_European_Countries/National-PB11-BS.pdf

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Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Specifically, the project aims to:

- Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the context of Central Asia's position in world politics;
- Enhance knowledge of Europe's engagement with Central Asia through top-quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies among Central Asian communities;
- Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central Asian relations.

Currently, the broader programme is coordinated by FRIDE, in partnership with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society Institute and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main outputs of the project are a series of policy briefs and comprehensive reports on key issues facing the Europe-Central Asia relationship.

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FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which provides fresh and innovative thinking on Europe's role on the international stage. Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic values, security and sustainable development. We seek to engage in rigorous analysis of the difficult debates on democracy and human rights, Europe and the international system, conflict and security, and development cooperation. FRIDE benefits from political independence and the diversity of views and intellectual background of its international team.



Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland. It engages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the supervision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in teaching. It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.