



EUCAM WATCH

EU-CENTRAL ASIA MONITORING

NATO and Central Asia

The two elephants that never meet

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has a keen interest in Central Asia due to the security and stability risks the region generates, as well as the negative spill-over effects from Afghanistan that impact upon the region. Although all five Central Asian Republics take part in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), concrete cooperation remains limited and is mostly oriented towards maintaining a dialogue. The Central Asian regimes feel they need to balance security cooperation with NATO with that of Russia (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and Russia-China (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), but at the same time they exploit NATO's and the U.S.'s dependence on keeping the Northern Distribution Network alive for troops and supplies to Afghanistan. Meanwhile NATO seeks to balance the demands of hard security interests with not losing sight of Central Asia's deploring democracy and human rights record. However, cooperation is clearly weighted in favour of NATO's practical interests: the ISAF mission in Afghanistan largely defines NATO relations with the Central Asian region.

Excluding policies towards Afghanistan, the European Union (EU) by-and-large has the same objectives as NATO when it comes to security in Central Asia, but completely different ways of going about pursuing a stable Central Asia that is a genuine partner. NATO's focus lies in dialogue with the Central Asian leaderships, keeping Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan open and some cooperation in the field of defence reform. The EU's approach is much more diverse and focuses on aspects of human security, which it tries to support through projects and funding for rule of law, good governance and water management, but at the same time also supporting Central Asian border management and so on. In doing so the EU of course has substantially more resources at its disposal and the EU's objectives in Central Asia are also much broader than merely security and partnership. Nonetheless, it is strange that the EU and NATO do not liaise much in general, particularly when it comes to policies on and ties with Central Asia. As one policymaker said, "NATO and the EU are like two elephants running through the same city (Brussels) while never meeting each other". This also applies to Central Asia where both rarely can be found in the same room.

This is unfortunate because there are several reasons that would make increased cooperation and fine-tuning of policies and approaches towards Central Asia worthwhile. First, both have only a limited presence in the region. Whereas the EU is stepping up its presence on the ground by opening up an EU Delegation in Uzbekistan (on top of already having delegations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), NATO only has a liaison officer present and is represented by (contact) embassies of NATO members in the region. Active exchange of information – in Brussels through regular meetings and in the region between EU delegations and European NATO members' embassies including U.S. and Turkish embassies – would be beneficial to both.

Second, U.S. and European policies towards Central Asia are increasingly divergent. The EU takes a broad approach by looking at a whole spectrum of issues, from energy interests to the promotion of democratic values and human rights to security interests, while the U.S.'s approach is becoming narrower by concentrating foremost on (hard) security matters and seeing Central Asia primarily through an Afghanistan lens. NATO brings Europe and the U.S. together in one organisation, and also includes Turkey, itself an active and substantial actor in Central Asia. In the wake of the growing influence of Russia and China in the region increased coordination between the EU and NATO seems a logical step.

Third, NATO as well as the EU is concerned about the development of Afghanistan over the coming years, especially post-2014 when the ISAF mission will be concluded and troops will have been withdrawn. As the EU and NATO work together on the ground in Afghanistan it would make sense to extend practical cooperation to Central Asia. This is especially true of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who are the most vulnerable to the potential increase of extremism and drug trafficking. Again, NATO having the

U.S. and Turkey on board could help the EU in planning border management assistance and other security-related support such as disaster preparedness and aspects of security sector reform and governance. Joint programming could also be envisaged in some of these areas, possibly including the OSCE and UNDP.

Lastly, the EU and NATO will also need to take a joint approach in fostering regional cooperation concerning Afghanistan. This should include not only Pakistan, but certainly Central Asia and hopefully Iran as well. Regional cooperation will be difficult to promote in a region with so many influential players with often contradictory interests. This is why at least NATO and the EU need to have their act together and move jointly in bringing other parties to the table.

This EUCAM Watch is devoted to NATO and Central Asia. An insight into NATO's activities in the region is provided by NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai. Alexander Cooley writes about the Northern Distribution Network and the U.S. plans for the New Silk Road, while Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse discuss NATO in connection to the Russian driven CSTO and the Russia-China led SCO.

Editorial by Jos Boonstra, Head EUCAM programme

Interview

Interview with the NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai

1. How are the Central Asian Republics working with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP)?

Since the NATO Summit in Istanbul in 2004 the Alliance has made additional efforts to deepen cooperation with all of its Central Asian Partners, including appointing a Special Representative for the region and sending a Liaison Officer to the region. Each Central Asian partner nation determines its own level of participation in the PfP, given diversity of perspectives among the five countries. So each individual country makes use of the various tools and levels of partnership that we offer according to its own priorities.

All Central Asian Republics have joined a mechanism that we call the IPCP or Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. This programme offers a wide range of partnership activities including defence reform, defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness, as well as cooperation on science and environmental issues.

There are additional mechanisms, like PARP (Planning and Review Process) and IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) that we offer to our Central Asian partners. These are more complex programmes, which require a higher level of cooperation with NATO, but allow access to a wider range of partnership activities.

2. In many PfP countries NATO is active in support of defence reform as part of security sector reform and governance. What are the activities and possibilities with Central Asian countries in this respect?

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A key objective is to promote the effective and efficient management of defence institutions, as well as civilian and democratic control of the armed forces. We also want to help the militaries of all our partners to become increasingly interoperable with NATO, in order to allow them to work as smoothly as possible with the Alliance, and so enhance the effectiveness of any current or future NATO operations in which they might wish to participate.

The Planning and Review Process or PARP, as we call it, is the key instrument for helping partners with these reforms. Partners whose cooperation with NATO is more advanced participate in this mechanism in which some of their security forces also undergo defence review procedures similar to those of NATO Allies themselves, in order to prepare them to participate in international peacekeeping operations. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan participate in the PARP process, while Tajikistan has expressed an interest in doing so in the future.

The PARP mechanism has a flexible nature and it is up to the partners to decide on the priority areas of defence reform and defence review. The Kazakh government's efforts at achieving greater interoperability with NATO troops have led to the creation, assisted by NATO, of a Kazakh battalion (KAZBAT). While this was not in a NATO context, KAZBAT has successfully deployed alongside Polish troops in Iraq for a demining mission.

3. Several Central Asian states are also members of the Collective Security and Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with which NATO has no official ties. Does this complicate cooperation with Central Asia?

Let me first emphasise that NATO's engagement with Central Asia is complementary with that of other actors in the region. For Central Asian countries, cooperation with NATO is not, and should not be, a "zero-sum game".

NATO strongly believes that it is the sovereign right of each individual state to determine its own security arrangements and that cooperation with one regional organisation does not preclude cooperation with any other regional organisation.

NATO and its partners have undertaken initiatives to promote and coordinate practical cooperation and the exchange of expertise in areas such as combating terrorism and border security. I am confident that this cooperation will continue to fulfil its potential and contribute to increased security in Central Asia, which is particularly relevant in the context of transition in Afghanistan.

4. Kazakhstan seems to have progressed furthest in Central Asia within the PfP. How is the Individual Partnership Action Plan proceeding and has it led to increased cooperation and reform?

The IPAP is a more advanced cooperation mechanism, in which a Partner and NATO jointly agree on a detailed programme of security sector reform. The benefits of participating in more advanced programmes are linked to greater access to NATO expertise and assistance in conducting the reforms identified by the Partner.

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country to have agreed an IPAP with the Alliance, in early 2006. Since then, Kazakhstan has been making substantial progress in defence reform and interoperability. Currently, we are working on the third cycle of the IPAP process with Kazakhstan for the period of 2012-2013 and plan to finalise it in February.

5. Have the 2010 revolutionary changes in Kyrgyzstan brought an opportunity for NATO to increase cooperation with that country, including in the field of discussing democratic practice and human rights issues in defence matters?

NATO's relations with Kyrgyzstan date back to the early 90s and cover already a wide range of areas. Currently, we are considering new projects which were requested by Kyrgyzstan which include a trust fund on the management of weapon storage facilities, projects on leftover and unwanted uranium residue, as well as defence reforms.

6. What is the nature of NATO relations with Turkmenistan? How does NATO see Turkmenistan's increased activism in urging regional cooperation on Afghanistan?

As with all other Central Asian Republics, Turkmenistan joined the IPCP. Within this programme, Turkmenistan chose not to participate in military activities, in line with its position of "neutrality". This does not, however, preclude cooperation in key areas included in the IPCP, such as Civil Emergency Planning and Science for Peace and Security projects.

In the past few years, we have witnessed more sustained engagement from all Central Asian countries, including Turkmenistan, with regard to assisting Afghanistan. NATO regards this as a positive development in the region. We have held a number of discussions in the format we call 28+5+1, which is the 28 NATO Allies, plus the 5 Central Asian States, plus Afghanistan. In all of our contact with the Central Asian states, we have urged them to continue to play an active role in assisting Afghanistan and discussing regional security issues with Afghanistan.

7. Uzbekistan is logistically essential to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Is NATO capable of addressing human rights violations with the authoritarian leadership while also maintaining the Northern Distribution Network?

Let me stress that partnership is about more than practical cooperation – it is also about values. By signing the PfP Framework Document, Central Asian partners committed to respect international law, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully.

It is no secret that Central Asian countries still have some way to go to fully live up to these standards. However, we believe that we can assist this process through our cooperation. As with other partners,

we also highlight with Uzbekistan the importance of values such as democratic standards and the rule of law. At the same time, we believe that we can have practical cooperation that goes hand in hand with our efforts to stress the need for the Central Asian states to live up to all of their commitments.

8. Does NATO plan to intensify cooperation with Tajikistan as the most fragile and poorest country in the region?

Tajikistan joined PfP in 2002, the last Central Asian partner to do so. Indeed, cooperation with Tajikistan has been hampered by practical issues including lack of resources and English language capability. Nevertheless, Tajikistan has shown growing interest in recent years in slowly but steadily enhancing its cooperation with NATO. President Rahmon visited NATO HQ in February 2009 for the second time where he noted his country's willingness to expand cooperation.

A NATO-sponsored Summer Academy in Dushanbe has become an annual event, and includes participation from across Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Currently, we are launching a trust fund project aimed at the destruction of surplus ammunition.

NATO also regularly engages with regional actors in order to address the security needs of Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan. In this framework, we have regular consultations with the OSCE and, more recently, also with the EU.

9. What do you see as the major risks and threats to Central Asia after ISAF troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in the coming years?

Over the next three years, NATO's role will progressively evolve from combat to training and support of Afghan security forces. The process that we call transition to Afghan lead responsibility is on track, and will be completed by the end of 2014. However, we will not abandon Afghanistan once transition is over. Afghanistan's needs in the coming years cover many areas, such as governance, justice, development and economic growth. We are confident that the international community will play its full part when ISAF's combat mission comes to a close. At the Lisbon summit last year we agreed on an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan. And at our next summit in Chicago, we will set out how that will work, by agreeing a package of concrete assistance measures. NATO will not let Afghanistan slip back into the hands of militants, but NATO does not aspire to lead the support effort in all areas in which Afghanistan needs assistance. The whole international community has a stake in a stable Afghanistan, and the whole international community must help achieve it.

Analysis

Roadblocks on the New Silk Road: The Challenges of Externally Promoting Central Asian Economic Cooperation

By Alexander Cooley, the Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University in New York and author of the forthcoming 'Great Games, Local Rules: the New Great Power Contest in Central Asia' (Oxford University Press). The author is also a member of the Board of Advisers of the Open Society Foundation's Central Eurasia Project, an organisation which supports EUCAM. The opinions expressed are entirely his own.

As NATO looks to reduce its major combat presence in Afghanistan, Western officials are exploring how to promote greater economic cooperation between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbours. Two recent initiatives – the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and the “New Silk Road” (NSR) strategy – have been touted as important steps in fostering much needed regional economic integration. Yet, the problems that have arisen in the operation of the NDN over the last few years may well be a harbinger of the challenges that will confront the ambitious NSR.

The NDN was established in 2008 to provide U.S. and ISAF forces alternatives to the volatile and politically vulnerable supply routes that enter Afghanistan from Pakistan. NDN routes are a remarkable logistical undertaking, traversing large portions of the Eurasian landmass. On the main NDN routes, cargo is offloaded onto Baltic ports and then transported by rail through Russia, Kazakhstan and onto Uzbekistan and the Afghan border. An NDN South spur originates in Poti, Georgia, goes by rail across to Azerbaijan and then by ferry to Aktau, before being loaded onto trucks. In both strands, Uzbekistan serves as a hub, with five out of every six containers making their way to Afghanistan via the Termez-Hairaton crossing.

Until 2008, NDN transit accounted for only about 10 percent of Afghanistan-bound shipments compared with Pakistan's 90 percent; in 2011 total transit through the NDN had increased to 60 percent (though initially planned to reach 75 percent), and this percentage appears likely to increase in 2012 given continued political tensions between the United States and Pakistan. Beyond its critical role as a transit route for NATO supplies, officials expressed hopes that forging the NDN would also generate regional economic benefits in the form of improved infrastructure, transit technologies and greater trade volumes.

Over the last year, U.S. and NATO leaders have also rolled out the NSR, an ambitious plan to contribute to Afghanistan's post-2014 economic development by establishing regional economic links between Afghanistan and its Central and South Asian neighbours. Under the plan, the international community will assist with the upgrading of regional infrastructure such as roads, railways, bridges and pipelines. Furthermore, planners are particularly interested in connecting Central Asian energy production with potential markets in Afghanistan and South Asia. Clearly, given that Afghanistan's GDP remains almost completely dependent on foreign assistance, expanding economic opportunity and regional activity should be a priority for NATO. Yet, however laudable these goals, a number of challenges have plagued the NDN, and these are also likely to hamper the NSR.

First, these two regional initiatives conflate two distinct types of economic activity – “rent-seeking”, or the use of political power by government officials to gain access to fixed income streams, with

productive private investment.

The whole premise of the NDN was to offer Central Asian governments hefty transit fees as the necessary economic incentives to secure their cooperation on these new logistical arrangements. Central Asian officials have regularly hiked transit tariffs, while bureaucrats and customs officials demand informal payments and delay shipments without them. A comparison of basic indicators provided by the World Bank about the Central Asian countries suggests that between 2008 and 2011, despite the ramping up of the NDN, there have been no broad improvements in the long clearing times required for exports and imports to and from the region.

Nor have U.S. attempts to procure goods and supplies from Central Asian vendors – a move encouraged by General Petraeus' decision in 2009 to waive federal guidelines in order to encourage more local sourcing – yielded a significant surge in regional trade. Between 2008 and 2012, the total amount of Central Asian procurement for the NDN was about \$155 million, a much smaller amount than was originally anticipated (in 2009, Uzbek officials reportedly set an annual goal of \$100 million). This volume can only increase significantly if Central Asian elites decide that they have more to gain from encouraging formal trade than by collecting large informal payments, which depresses it.

Similarly, with the New Silk Road, the impending 2014 deadline for the NATO drawdown from the region may encourage Central Asian officials to focus on securing as many short-term projects as possible, with scant regard for the regional dimension. This appears to be the fate of the multilateral Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme, which has ambitiously poured billions of dollars into the construction of a set of regional corridors, yet the project has stalled as each recipient has used the funds for its own highway construction without committing to actually improving cross-border transit and transactions.

Second, rather than act as a force to increase economic integration and regional cooperation, it appears that aspects of the NDN have actually increased intraregional competition among the Central Asian states.

The central importance of Uzbekistan has exacerbated its regional economic rivalries and highlighted simmering border tensions. Over the last year hundreds of freight cars bound for Tajikistan have piled up at the Uzbek border, while individual border crossings between the countries have been closed and militarised. In November 2011, a railway spur from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan, which the Tajik authorities claimed could handle increased NDN traffic volume, was blown up under mysterious circumstances. In Kyrgyzstan, officials complain that Tajik companies and drivers exclusively operate the trucks running within the Tajik-Kyrgyz NDN spur. Thus, for the Central Asian states, concerns over how much rival states gain from the NDN appear to be trumping the emergence of new cooperative initiatives.

Finally, as a “grand idea” without an accompanying blueprint, the NSR may unnecessarily lend geopolitical overtones to a group of projects that otherwise might be widely accepted as primarily developmental. The NSR is pragmatically open-ended, allowing for a number of disparate projects, initiatives and developmental plans to be bundled together. But the umbrella of a single strategic concept also emboldens sceptics, particularly in Moscow and Beijing, to infer that the West is positioning itself to maintain enduring regional influence.

Beijing has already expressed concerns about the “New Silk

Road” term, while Russian economic planners, in an attempt to balance China’s growing Central Asian economic role, are focused on building a Russian-dominated new Eurasian Union and Common Economic Space. Including into the NSR existing high-profile projects such as the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline (which the U.S. strongly supports and China and Russia oppose) makes it more likely that neighbouring countries will dismiss the initiative as a whole on geopolitical grounds.

Instead of signalling a grand vision for Afghanistan’s regional future, NATO planners should consider toning down their strategy in favour of a few select projects that enhance links with countries that truly wish to expand their ties within the region. Overall, Central Asia continues to be one of the most trade-restrictive regions in the world. No externally-sponsored initiative, however well-intentioned, will change these rent-seeking patterns or cut the red tape. A lower profile, piecemeal approach might allow some Central Asian governments to more pragmatically engage with the projects that benefit them, while disregarding those that do not. And eschewing strategic labels may help reassure regional powers that the West harbours no geopolitical ambitions beyond successfully stabilising Afghanistan. Heading towards 2014, this lower profile may be NATO’s best course of action.

Why NATO doesn’t talk with the SCO and the CSTO

By Malène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, EUCAM Researchers

Currently there exists no institutional framework for discussion between NATO, the Moscow-backed Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Russia and China-supported Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Instead NATO discusses issues with Moscow under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. The Alliance does not want to build institutionalised ties with the CSTO because it believes the organisation reduces the autonomy of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the benefit of Russia. And when it comes to China and the SCO, there is not even a “partnership dialogue”.

At a time when NATO’s legitimacy is being questioned, and debates over the regionalisation of solutions for post-2014 Afghanistan are multiplying, it has become common to encourage NATO to move closer to the CSTO and SCO. In doing so, NATO would have to take these organisations seriously, accepting them as more than just Russian and Chinese national policy mechanisms, while disregarding the democratic foundations the Alliance seeks to promote alongside its hard security interests. Although this seems unlikely to happen, are there any opportunities for cooperation between the three organisations, and what are the constraints to their potential development?

The limited capacities of the three organisations must be recognised, as well as the fact that Central Asia has no regional security organisation that encompasses all five states: Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO or the SCO, and Uzbek membership in the CSTO and the SCO is reluctant. All five do participate to different extents in NATO’s PfP.

NATO today is an institution in financial crisis mainly as a result of declining defence budgets, particularly in Europe but also in the United States. Its international legitimacy in managing post-Cold War conflicts has been undermined due to its limited success in Afghanistan and disagreements over the intervention in Libya. Moreover, the transatlantic relationship has weakened because of

reduced European contributions and changing U.S. policies, with (former) Defence Secretary Robert Gates warning last year that the institution is threatened with “military irrelevance”. The PfP does not aim to shore up Central Asia’s security, but rather to engage in dialogue with the local governments. Therefore, the offers it has made to the local governments are modest as compared to its involvement in the Balkans, Ukraine and the South Caucasus.

Meanwhile the SCO has remained a paper tiger in terms of regional security. The organisation has attained only one of its declared objectives, namely black listing and extraditing Uyghur dissidents. In all other aspects of collective strategic cooperation, the gap between its institutional rhetoric and its lack of joint mechanisms is vast.

The CSTO in Central Asia is only active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and even then the Kremlin’s desire to strengthen military cooperation runs up against Dushanbe’s reluctance, Bishkek’s hesitations and Astana’s desires for autonomy and a multi-vector policy. Furthermore, Moscow does not know how to prepare for the non-traditional threats arising in the region, and for any possible waves of political destabilisation such as those that rocked Kyrgyzstan in 2010.

In this context, the CSTO and SCO are not really NATO’s direct rivals in Central Asia. To enter into competition with them, NATO would have to aim at integrating the security policies of the Central Asian states into a solid regional structure, which is not the case. For its part, the SCO has not positioned itself as an organisation with a substantial military component, and instead confines itself to promoting a “healthy” Central Asian order, free from the so-called three evils of separatism, extremism and fundamentalism, and devoid of pro-Western forces. Only Russia offers willing Central Asian states the complete array of bilateral and multilateral relations, including arms sales at reduced prices, training, joint exercises and intelligence exchanges.

In terms of cooperation with NATO, Kazakhstan is the most advanced state of Central Asia. Astana has an IPAP with NATO and takes part in an Action Plan against Terrorism, which provides for the exchange of information with NATO members. It also hosts the annual “Steppe Eagle” anti-terrorism exercises and created a symbolic peacekeeping force called KAZBRIG that collaborates with NATO under a UN mandate. Astana also seeks to step up efforts in NATO interoperability in the coming years. However, this does not prevent Kazakhstan from being a major ally of Moscow in the post-Soviet era, or from showing its support for most of the Russian proposals for strengthened integration. Kazakhstan therefore shows how the programmes offered by NATO and the CSTO can be complementary rather than competitive.

In contrast with the CSTO, the SCO has not raised the idea of cooperation with NATO. China would probably be reluctant for this type of rapprochement, even if informal discussions between senior officials do take place. But NATO also has little to share with the SCO. The SCO’s definition of the three evils runs contrary to NATO’s political objectives. The Atlantic Treaty Organisation cannot lend its support to SCO rhetoric on domestic security and the value gap between them is substantial. The areas of cooperation between Western institutions and China are at best limited to a better coordinated anti-drug strategy, but none involve any hard military security. Even on issues linked to regional security China is extremely reluctant to become more involved in Afghanistan or in the fight against drug-trafficking.

Hitherto, only Russia has regularly requested an institutionalising

of NATO-CSTO cooperation. Moscow wants to have a say in NATO decision-making. While this is unlikely to happen, there is a window of opportunity for NATO-Russia cooperation with the forthcoming withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. Russia is concerned about the consequences of this transition for Central Asian stability and would probably not be willing to carry the burden of providing security support to Central Asia alone. But for a step up in cooperation Russia is likely to demand NATO's recognition of the CSTO; not as a symbol of Russian "imperialism" in Central Asia, but as a legitimate regional institution, validated by the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik governments. NATO might not be ready for this step and in any case would prefer to work bilaterally with Russia and the Central Asian states through PfP.

Potential NATO-CSTO discussions also presuppose that the governments of Central Asia, at least the most cooperative ones, would take an interest in developing joint measures. Kazakhstan might support NATO-CSTO links and the relatively weak Kyrgyz and Tajik authorities can probably be convinced, but Uzbekistan would likely resist. Furthermore, all local governments have tended to put external actors against one another rather than promote cooperation between them.

Under current conditions, it would thus be naive to think that cooperation between the institutions will happen any time soon. NATO is reluctant to take the CSTO seriously; Russia hesitates between investing in the CSTO or the SCO; China is not interested in multilateral initiatives it does not control; and the Central Asian governments play the competition card. Nonetheless, the approaching security changes after 2014, as well as the financial, military and political limits of the three organisations are likely to push them increasingly towards reconciliation and bring possible avenues of cooperation into policy debates about Central Asia and Afghanistan.

EUCAM Publications

Policy Briefs

EU Human Rights and Democratisation Assistance to Central Asia: In Need of Further Reform

Vera Axyonova, EUCAM Policy Brief No. 22, January 2012

The EU seeks to promote democracy and human rights in Central Asia through three specific funding mechanisms that complement the broader Development Cooperation Instrument. Central Asia is a difficult region for the EU to promote its values. Assistance needs to be targeted and integrated to have any effect. What measures could be taken to revise and strengthen current mechanisms?

Download: http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Policy_Briefs/PB_EUCAM-22.pdf

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Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Specifically, the project aims to:

- Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the context of Central Asia's position in world politics;
- Enhance knowledge of Europe's engagement with Central Asia through top-quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies among Central Asian communities;
- Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central Asian relations.

Currently, the broader programme is coordinated by FRIDE, in partnership with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society Institute and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main outputs of the project are a series of policy briefs and comprehensive reports on key issues facing the Europe-Central Asia relationship.

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Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland. It engages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports the supervision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and participates in teaching. It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities: Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural Studies.



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